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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

AGDA-A (M)(10 Feb 71) FOR OT UT 71B008

18 February 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Henry R. Del Mar, CG,
US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, Period 16 October 1969
to 16 September 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Henry R. Del Mar, subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
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AVHGC-DST

18 JAN 1971

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG Henry R. Del Mar


Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Inclosed are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG Henry R. Del Mar. BG Del Mar's report covers the period 16 October 1969 - 16 September 1970, during which time he served as Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Can Ranh Bay.

2. BG Del Mar is recommended as a guest speaker at appropriate service schools.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as (trip)
2 cy wd HQ DA


Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Cap. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Debriefing Report for Brigadier General Henry R. Del Mar, USA,
Commanding General, United States Army Support Command - Cam Ranh
Bay

PERIOD October 1969 - September 1970

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1. References:

- a. Army Regulation 1-26, dated 4 November 1966
- b. USARV Regulation 1-3, dated 1 June 1968

2. Scope. This report covers the operation of a corps level logistical command in support of United States, Korean, Australian and Vietnamese forces during counterinsurgency operations in the Republic of Vietnam from October 1969 to September 1970.

3. Mission and Functions

a. As one of the four logistical support commands subordinate to Headquarters, USARV, the USASUPCOM-CRB has the mission to provide supply, maintenance and service support, including transportation, to US and other Free World Forces located in the southern half of Military Region II. The area covers about 15,500 square miles. Logistical support is provided to approximately 68,317 troops and civilians, US Army troops comprising less than half the total. The general breakdown of the type units supported is shown in Inclosure 2.

b. This support command additionally provides backup support to the other three support commands. For example, the ammunition safety level of the Da Nang Support Command is stocked in the Ammunition Storage Areas at Cam Ranh Bay. A phase down of the Qui Nhon Support Command was initiated and has been continuing. This will gradually centralize logistical support to all MR II at Cam Ranh Bay. Support to Qui Nhon will be accomplished by employing containerization and Roll-On/Roll-Off transportation techniques already tested and conventional "break bulk" supply operations. Qui Nhon Support Command will continue to be supported through the port of Qui Nhon.

4. Organization.

a. Headquarters, United States Army Support Command - Cam Ranh Bay. The headquarters element of the Command was organized under "The Administrative Support Theater Army (TASTA-70)(Modified)" concept during December 1968. Prior to that time, the organization consisted of a combined general, director, and special staff. The reorganization created a functionally oriented staff as shown in Inclosure 3. In addition, a Special Assistant for Combat Security (SACS) has been added.

b. Major Subordinate Commands

(1) The 124th Transportation Command (Terminal A) operates all transportation services throughout the Support Command area. It operates Cam Ranh Port, outports at Phan Rang, Nha Trang, and an "over-the-beach" operation at Phan

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Thiet. In addition, this command provides pilot service to ships entering or departing Cam Ranh Port and operates the Beach Discharge Lighter (BDL) John U.D. Page, a unique oceangoing vessel capable of over-the-beach operations. The principal elements of the 124th Transportation Command are the 10th and 24th Transportation Battalions (Inclosure 4). The former is organized for port operations and includes terminal service, heavy boat and other assorted detachments required for watercraft operations and documentation. The 24th Transportation Battalion conducts all port and beach clearing, local hauling, and line hauling throughout Military Region II (South). Line haul operations are conducted at least weekly to the Logistical Support Activities at Ban Me Thuot and Dalat, the Liaison Activity at Bao Loc and to the provisional brigade trains area at Song Mao in support of Task Force South.

(2) The 54th General Support Group is principally engaged in direct support to the customer and is organized as shown in Inclosure 5. The Group is composed of three commodity oriented battalions that provide direct support maintenance, ammunition and bulk and packaged POL. The Group operates five Logistical Support Activities (LSAs) at Ban Me Thuot, Dalat, Phan Rang, Phan Thiet and Nha Trang, one POL supply point at Gia Nghia and a contact team at Bao Loc. The LSAs stock rations, bulk and packaged POL, Class II and IV supplies and Class V supplies in their respective areas to support specific missions as required. Such services as graves registration, laundry and bath, and direct support maintenance are also provided as required. The 54th Group also provides direct support of all types to USARV units and other units located on the Cam Ranh Peninsula.

(3) The United States Army Depot-Cam Ranh Bay is the major wholesale supplier in Military Region II (South) and is gradually becoming the prime supplier for all of MR II. Its physical plant includes more than 17 acres of open, shed and warehouse storage area. As of 31 July 1970, the Depot had 207,904 tons of supplies and equipment of hand in all classes of supply, less Class III (bulk and packaged) and Class V. The organization is shown in Inclosure 6.

(4) Special Troops - Special Troops consists of a combination of specialized units that provide personnel, finance and postal services, as well as accomplish post housekeeping missions. Organization is shown as Inclosure 7.

(5) Attached Units - The United States Army Marine Maintenance Activity-Vietnam (USAMMAV) is headquartered at Cam Ranh Bay and is the principal marine maintenance activity in Vietnam. Detachments are located at Saigon and Da Nang Support Command. The CRB activity includes a 1900 ton dry-dock and general support marine maintenance facilities which comprise the major MMAV capability. A major portion of the marine maintenance is performed under contract with the Vinnell Corporation. Organization is as shown at Inclosure 8. Since 15 June 1970, MMAV has been under the operational control of USARV and attached to the Support Command.

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5. Operations.

a. **Port Operations:** The scale of the 124th Transportation Command's operation is extensive in both scope and variety. At the port of Cam Ranh Bay alone, facilities valued in excess of \$125 million and 3,800 persons are engaged in the movement of all types of cargo - general, ammunition, reefer, vehicles, and containers at an average rate of 195,192 S/T per month. The outports of Phan Rang and Phan Thiet move an additional 14,986 S/T per month.

(1) Cam Ranh Bay has five deep draft piers capable of working ten vessels simultaneously. The capabilities of these piers vary considerably. Although Piers 1, 4, and 5 are efficient, Pier 2 is too short (300 feet in length) and Pier 3 is too narrow (39 feet in width). Shallow draft operations are conducted at six LST ramps, one barge pier, and one sunken LST hull which is capable of working either a barge or an LST.

(2) At Cam Ranh Bay, the 124th Transportation Command has the responsibility for managing the entire port complex, to include assigning berths for vessels, providing tugs and pilots to assist vessels in berthing, and providing security for the port's terminal facilities. The command's responsibilities include coordinating and supervising the operations of two civilian stevedore contractors and monitoring the operations of one MSTC contractor in shallow draft operations.

(3) SEAPAC and the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) perform stevedoring operations for all deep draft vessels. SEAPAC is an American corporation with American supervisors and Korean laborers. They furnish 3 hatch gangs per 10 hour shift and work 2 shifts per day. In addition, they operate the US Army BD 6655, a 100 ton floating crane. The 10th Bn complements these civilian operations by the use of its military stevedores, concentrating on the discharging and outloading of reefer and ammunition cargo. The 10th Battalion also operates a stevedore training school for local nationals.

(4) The Alaska Barge and Transport Company (AB&T) performs shallow draft stevedoring at CRB and the outport of Phan Rang. AB&T is American owned and employs American, local and third country nationals.

(5) Nha Trang outport operations are generally shallow draft. Deep draft operations are conducted, however, by the use of lighterage. In addition, all ROKA deployment (an average of two troops ships per month) is handled through this outport. At Phan Rang, 9,000 short tons per month are moved over two LST ramps and one sunken barge pier. Finally, Phan Thiet is entirely shallow draft. Landing craft utilities, the USAV John U.D. Page, and LSTs can work the open beach, tide permitting.

(6) **Tonnage handled:** Average monthly figures based on October 1969 through July 1970 follow:

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CAM RANH BAY

Deep Draft	144,549 S/T*
Shallow Draft	50,643 S/T
TOTAL	195,192 S/T*

<u>NHA TRANG</u>	21,446 S/T
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<u>PHAN RANG</u>	9,270 S/T
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<u>PHAN THIET</u>	4,877 S/T
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TOTAL COMPLEX	230,785 S/T*
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*Total includes 79,002 S/T handled by Sealand.

b. Depot Operations:

(1) The Depot manages an inventory of approximately 207,904 tons composed of approximately 77,948 line items stored in six areas on the Cam Ranh Peninsula, i.e., the main Depot complex, engineer yard, engineer annex, asphalt storage area, the unserviceable property yard, and the property disposal yard. The Depot comprises about 255 acres of land, 34 general warehouses, eight subsistence warehouses (Four of which are cold storage) and 39 sheds.

(2) The Depot has three contracts with the Vinnell Corporation employing 547 US, third country, and local national civilians to operate the Engineer Construction Material Yard, the Care and Preservation Activity, and the Vehicle Park for major end items.

(3) The Depot also has four attached units with 245 military personnel. These are the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Delivery), the 67th and the 68th Engineer Gas Generating Detachments, and the 194th Quartermaster Detachment which inspects and classifies aerial delivery equipment.

(4) The Depot utilizes an IBM 7010 and a 1460 computer system in managing its supply operations and processes about 31,492 requisitions a month of which 13,712 are filled, 6,829 are established as back orders and 10,951 are passed to the ICCV. In addition, an average of 16,952 supply directives and referral orders are processed for other areas in RVN. The materiel release-denial rate has averaged 2.9% for the last six months. On an average, the Depot ships about 30,427 tons a month and receives about 26,451 tons valued at slightly over \$168,117,000.00.

(5) The standard supply system Vietnam (3SVN) has been implemented, wall-to-wall inventories are performed to provide an accurate data base, storage areas have been improved with rewarehousing of stocks to preclude deterioration

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and procedures have been initiated to increase capacity for handling more tonnage with faster delivery time to customers. An aggressive retrograde program is underway to move excess stocks out of Vietnam. Maximum effort is being expended to achieve accurate inventory, valid demand data, and efficient management in order to meet combat requirements effectively and economically whenever and wherever required.

c. Direct Support Activities:

(1) Direct Support supply is provided to units of Military Region II (South) through five Logistical Support Activities, one Supply Point, one Contact Team, and a Class II, IV and VII DSU at Cam Ranh Bay. The LSAs provide Class I, II and IV supplies to the supported units on demand. In addition, there are 15 "fast moving" expendable items stocked at the LSAs to meet customer requirements. These include paper products, barrier materials and bottled oxygen and acetylene gas. Class II and VII items are requisitioned from the supporting DSU through the LSA maintenance detachments.

(2) Artillery R&R Program: The "Return and Recuperation" (R&R) program for self-propelled artillery has been improved considerably. Artillery pieces are brought by their crews into the 69th Maintenance Battalion shops where they are checked out completely. A float chassis is kept available as a means of reducing turn around time. Current experiences indicate that a carriage can be in and out of the shops in less than seven days. This program and recent innovations to improve the quality of maintenance has been extremely effective in improving the availability of artillery weapons systems. The crews have an opportunity to work directly with highly trained mechanics on their own weapons. Motivation is high as the weapons systems' availability statistics show.

(3) Forklift deadline problems have been reduced through a three part program. Classes on preventive maintenance indicators are being given to operator and supervisory personnel on a revolving basis. Vinnell Corporation has been given the responsibility for MHE dispatch operation and pre and post dispatch inspections. Finally, DS/GS shops have shifted emphasis, devoting all available assets to implementing a forklift priority maintenance program. Controlled substitution repair parts have been authorized where possible. The results of this program are reflected in the commercial and rough terrain forklift availability statistics, which have increased from approximately 65% in September to over 90% at the present time.

(4) Increased emphasis on an organizational maintenance program has reduced the deadline rate drastically. The most significant rate improvements have occurred with combat tracks, five-ton vehicles and forklifts. Several management actions have been introduced to improve the overall maintenance effectiveness within the Command and to provide better support of the customer units:

(a) Extensive use is being made of Department of the Army Agency Technical Representatives on a revolving basis. On call assistance is also provided.

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(b) Close coordination and liaison has been established with customer units to resolve specific maintenance and maintenance management problems before they become major problems.

(c) Publication and distribution of a periodic Maintenance Newsletter. This letter cites lessons learned and recurring faults and has been partially responsible for the increased number of CMMI's passed during recent months.

(d) The establishment of a Maintenance Education Center. Included in the curriculum are an engine diagnostic procedures course, generator maintenance, MACK diesel organizational maintenance and operation, CMMI preparation techniques, fuel and electric repair training and topical instruction on current maintenance problems. Classes began on 10 February 1970.

(5) Closed Loop Supply Program (CLSP). An increased emphasis had been placed on "policing" the Closed Loop program. Corrective actions at several levels have been initiated to cause commanders and operating personnel to realize the importance of returning "reparables" and effecting the orderly and timely turn-in of overage or over due material rebuild candidates. To assist in disseminating policy for this program, my headquarters has published Support Command Regulation 700-39, which delineates the responsibilities of depot, support and organizational units with regard to the CLSP program. In addition, steps are being taken to insure that proper accounting procedures are maintained so that Closed Loop materiel departing RVN is treated accordingly. In December 1969, an audit was conducted which disclosed that \$538,988.00 in unreported unserviceable assets were shipped out-of-country without proper credit given to the Command. Regulation 700-39 addresses this and other matters dealing with accountability.

(6) Marine Maintenance Operations: The maintenance of all floating plants such as barge tugs, floating cranes, reefer barges, and outboard and inboard motor boats is performed by the Marine Maintenance Activity - Vietnam (MMAV). MMAV provides marine support maintenance for all US Army watercraft and amphibians in Vietnam. Vietnamese military watercraft are also supported. Since October 1969, the number of watercraft repaired or overhauled at the Cam Ranh Bay MMAV facility was 62. The statistics shown in Inclosure 9 provide a distribution of activity by type vessel and service performed. The acquisition of the 1900 ton and 1200 ton dry docks have made it possible to drastically reduce the amount of out-of-country repair work. Out-of-country work is costly in terms of the time that the vessel is out-of-country and the cost of the maintenance performed. The savings in vessel availability is significant using in-country facilities. Current in-country repair time of 30-45 days for overhaul compare favorably with out-of-country repairs and overhaul that vary between 8 and 15 months.

(7) Combat Logistical Operations:

(a) The largest joint United States-ARVN operation in MR II to date was conducted in the Quang Duc - DarLac Province area during the period September through December 1969. A major effort on the part of this command was directed

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to the support of this operation. The After Action Report for this operation is contained in Inclosure 9. The several lessons learned and the experience obtained from this operation will influence the conduct of our support to future joint operations.

(b) Operation Binh Tay (Allied Forces in Cambodia): The Support Command played a very active part in every aspect of the Cambodian operations launched from Military Region II. Early in May we readied the 2d Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry for relocation from its area of operation in Ninh Thuan Province under Task Force SOUTH to OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division in Military Region II (North). Once the 4th Division crossed into Cambodia, opposite Pleiku, this command supported the operation with riggers to assist in retrograde of captured enemy food and material and back-up Class IV and V support from Cam Ranh Bay. In the two crossings west of Ban Me Thuot, the Support Command supported both operations with the establishment and operation of a major refuel point at Duc Lap and subsidiary support to a refuel point operated by the 17th Combat Aviation Group at Ban Don, located approximately 35 miles NW of Ban Me Thuot. In addition to the detailed logistical support provided to each phase of Binh Tay, the Support Command provided major rigger effort in support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division operating in the Song Be and Bu Dop area for the purpose of evacuating captured enemy food and materiel in NW MR III. At the height of the operation, more than 100 riggers from the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aerial Delivery) were committed to the Cambodian operation. A complete after action report is attached at Inclosure 10.

d. Services. Services consisted of graves registration, laundry, bath, engineering, internal supply, food services, and property disposal activities.

(1) Graves Registration. Graves registration collecting points are established at Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Phan Rang, and Phan Thiet. The deceased and their personal effects are rapidly moved to the Saigon Mortuary for processing and movement to CONUS. Remains from the inland LSA's are processed at the coastal LSA locations. This important function works well.

(2) Laundry Operations: Field Laundry has averaged in excess of 700,000 pounds per month. Contract laundry cost has averaged \$93,368 per month.

(3) Engineering: There are no engineering troops organic to the Support Command for the performance of routine and emergency repairs or construction. As a result, we have experienced extreme difficulty in performing normal maintenance of the present physical plant and conducting normal routine improvements. Installation engineering is performed by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) under the contract supervision of the US Army Engineer Command Vietnam (Provisional). New construction when authorized is handled by engineer troop labor from the 18th Engineer Brigade or by contract with RMK. The list of projects engaged in during the period covered by this report is included in Inclosure 11.

(4) Property Disposal: To improve the operation of property disposal within my command, I have directed that the yard's present location at the extreme

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north end of the Cam Ranh Peninsula be vacated in favor of the area south of the Air Force Base recently declared excess by RMK. The relocation of the PDC yard will greatly improve the security posture of our PD operations and permit out-loading of materiel from RVN via an existing barge pier. In addition, covered and open storage and adequate administrative areas are available. To assist in this important operation I have addressed the entire question of Property Disposal with increased management emphasis at all levels of command. The potential savings from actions taken to date will more than finance the expenditures in people and management effort being devoted to this facility. Property Disposal is a matter of Command emphasis in this command.

(5) Food Service. New incentives through awards have been initiated in this Command. Best "mess" inspections are conducted and used as criteria for awarding the several plaques for achievement. Close attention is paid to insure quality food preparation and service.

e. Contract Operations. Contractors are being used in stevedoring, depot supply operations, and care and preservation and maintenance of materiel. In the main, this arrangement has been highly satisfactory. The only apparent weakness has been possible work stoppages due to labor problems, which have threatened on two occasions. Contract performance is closely monitored to insure that the contractor meets the desired standards. The command is also responsible for supervising sizable contracts for dairy products and laundry services. More than 3,400 personnel representing 16 contractors are engaged in the contracted effort with total cost exceeding \$31,000,000. The contractor operated maintenance facility includes both a field maintenance shop and a dry dock operation. The field maintenance activity represents backup for direct support and 100% of the command's capability for general support, while the marine maintenance represents most of the command's general support and all of the command's depot maintenance in the marine area. The major effort during recent months at Vinnell has been major assembly and vehicle rebuild. The dairy contract provides all milk, cottage cheese and ice cream used in MR II (South). It also provides some milk and cottage cheese to elements in other areas. The production under this contract is approximately 9,096 gallons of milk, 1,290 gallons of ice cream and 2,258 pounds of cottage cheese. Contracted stevedoring is indispensable in the Support Command's port operations. Currently, 87% of the Command's stevedoring capability is in contracted effort.

6. Security and Intelligence.

a. Geographic and Demographic Factors: The Support Command is positioned on the Cam Ranh Peninsula near Cam Ranh City, an autonomous unit of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN), in MR II (South). The peninsula is approximately 25 km long and from 1 to 7 km wide. It is bordered on the east by the South China Sea; on the north, by a sparsely populated area of sandy hills and scrub brush. The outer harbor affords excellent deep water anchorage and the bay itself is relatively shallow in most areas. A width of 300 meters at its most narrow point in the center allows navigation for deep water berthing. National Highway #1 (QL-1), a hard surfaced, high speed road, runs parallel to the peninsula from Ba Ngoi north to Nha Trang. Ba Ngoi is the seat of government

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for Cam Ranh City, one of six autonomous municipalities in RVN. The remainder of the city consists of 11 villages and some 35 hamlets with a combined population of approximately 95,000. There are two villages on the peninsula itself, one located in the Cam Ranh Support Command area, (Cam Ranh Village) and one adjacent to the western boundary of Cam Ranh Air Base (My Ca Village). The majority of the residents of Cam Ranh City are considered Pro-GVN and overt anti-Americanism is not evident. Several of the mainland villages, i.e., Quang Phuc, My Ca Refugee, etc, are relocation centers for refugees from provinces high in VC sympathy. It is possible that VC cadre and VC infrastructure are systematically infiltrated into refugee groups such as these and are organized in an attempt to gain support for the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army. In a 1969 pacification study prepared by the Combined Intelligence Center, only two hamlets in Cam Ranh City were placed in the "C" Security Category (subject to infrequent VC harassment, infrastructure identified, and some participation in self-help program). These hamlets were Quang Phuc (vic CP 002258) and Lap Dinh (vic BP 959392). The majority of the hamlets were in Security Category "B" (not immune to VC threat but security is organized and partially effective, and infrastructure partially neutralized. Self-help programs underway and economic programs started). Vietnamese military and intelligence agencies in the area utilize several methods to identify the VC cadre and infrastructure and overt Viet Cong sympathy and activity are rare. The relatively high standard of living and pacification successes have all but neutralized the success of VC/NVA proselytizing. Penetration of government agencies at all levels, however, remains a distinct possibility and hostile action directed at US personnel and installations remains a normal occurrence.

b. Enemy Forces: Composition, location and activity. The year 1969 and 1970 to 15 August have witnessed the highest enemy activity rate in the CRB area since 1954. There were a total of 48 significant shellings, 13 sapper attacks and probes and 7 incidents of harassment/terrorism. The enemy expended some 626 rounds of various types of ordnance resulting in moderate equipment and property damage. There were 3 US personnel killed by hostile action and 73 US personnel wounded. Enemy casualties were 2 killed and 2 swimmer/sappers captured. Fire attacks were predominant for the first half of the year; then beginning in August 1969, sapper activity as a part of a coordinated attack began to appear. The enemy also began using larger caliber weapons, specifically 107/140mm Soviet-made rockets, as well as 82mm mortar and occasional recoilless rifle fire. For the most part, the attacks occurred between 2300 and 0300 hours and normally during periods of low lunar illumination. There is no apparent pattern to the attacks in terms of the day of the week. Because most of the fire attacks have been launched from the same general area, vic 9828-9830, the local Vietnamese military officials are of the opinion that the attacks are conducted by small cells who infiltrate the launch areas as part of the local population engaged in wood-cutting, etc., and remain in the area overnight taking refuge in caves or other hiding places. After setting up the mortars and rockets and launching the attacks, the enemy mingles with the population again to exfiltrate the launch area going either to the local villages or to the security of the Ba Cum/To Hop valley area. Until such time as the launch area can be effectively cleared or saturated by combat and reconnaissance patrols, the VC in the area will retain the capability of harassing the Cam Ranh/Dong Ba Thin complex with mortars,

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rockets and sapper probes. POW interrogations and captured documents have conclusively identified the 407th VC/NVN Sapper Bn and the 10th Company, 95th VC Artillery Bn as located in the Ba Cum Secret Base some 20 km to the west of the peninsula. Both these units have been reported operating in the Cam Ranh area for more than a year. It is extremely doubtful that either of these units operates from any sort of cell organization. The launch areas are most likely infiltrated directly from the western base areas under cover of darkness. There is known to be an effective Viet Cong infrastructure organization operating in the villages of the Special Forces sector; however, for the most part, these personnel are political, finance and supply cadre who support the enemy but engage in offensive operations only if detected. The consistency in the location of enemy launch sites is probably due to the fact that from these positions the enemy can most effectively utilize the range of his rockets against area targets located on the peninsula.

c. Security. The concept of "perimeter" defense for the Cam Ranh Bay base is impractical and thereby not the best solution for the defense of the area. Cam Ranh Bay is not a fire base. It is an area surrounded on three sides by water, 1500 meters at its most narrow separation from the mainland. A mass ground attack by enemy forces in battalion or larger strength is, at best, a remote possibility. The plains area on the mainland from the Bay to the foothills of the Amman Mountain Range on the mainland averages some 3,000 meters and consist of short, scrubby vegetation affording excellent visibility of enemy troop concentrations. The movement of large numbers of troops by water is also unlikely due to the large amount of friendly shipping and regular 24 hour patrolling by the Naval Defense Unit at CRB. During a sustained "Yellow" alert, mission capability is degraded to such a degree under the perimeter concept that the following day, the Support Command is less than 60% operational. The size of Sector II (the Support Command's area of responsibility of the peninsula), some 85 square kms with 39 kms of perimeter, make the traditional "perimeter" concept with the large amount of personnel required to man it during "yellow" alert or higher, impractical. The concept would not be aligned to a realistic analysis of the enemy capabilities in the area. It is not in fact the best way to secure the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command area. Rather than commit large numbers of personnel to a "static" defense, an attempt was made to obtain a rapid reaction capability. This capability gave the Support Command the ability to defend those installations that are obviously critical to the continued operation of this command. Such facilities as the Ammunition Pier, power plant, POL tank farms, communications centers and automatic data processing center, fall into this category. Section II was further divided into subsectors with each assigned to a major subordinate command of Support Command for defense coordination purposes. The key guard posts on the existing perimeter act as an early warning line to the subsector's tactical operations center (TOC). Each subsector has organized its reaction forces to respond to contingency situations in critical areas. If the enemy activity exceeds the subsector's capability to react with organic forces, the subsector TOC is tied in by direct communication to the Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC). The JDOC, a combined joint service operation for the Cam Ranh Peninsula, can in turn call for air/artillery illumination, tactical troops from the 2/30th ROKA Regiment

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(helilifted into pre-selected LZ's thru-out the peninsula), and provide other support, as required. This rapid reaction capability during periods of increased alerts is considered an adequate compromise between providing security and maintaining operational capability. During recent months increased use of vehicular mounted zenon searchlights and radar have reinforced the security system. The ultimate solution lies in the attachment of a sufficiently large tactical force to provide genuine perimeter security, using organic personnel for interior security and defense against pilferage, sabotage from within, etc. Until the enemy capabilities in the area change drastically, the concept of "Alert, Detect and React" is deemed sufficient to provide security for the CRB logistical base complex.

d. Security and Logistical Support Activities.

(1) The US Army Support Command-Cam Ranh Bay is responsible for the physical security and ground defense programs for logistical support activities (LSAs) at Nha Trang, Ban Me Thuot, Phan Rang and Phan Thiet. The Support Command Headquarters is responsible for ensuring that adequate internal security arrangements exist for the protection of the LSAs. Close supervision of internal security arrangements is maintained through staff visits and command inspections.

(2) The following comments are offered concerning LSA security:

(a) The installation coordination system is entirely dependent upon the cooperation of all commands involved inasmuch as the area defense coordinator does not have command authority over tenant units. As such, the success of the system depends to a great degree on the personalities of the individual commanders and the approach taken by the coordinator. An aggressive program, if not handled with extreme cooperation, often leads to an alienation of tenant units and a degradation of the effort.

(b) A significant problem area is the providing of adequate port, harbor and outport security. In major port areas such as Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang, the existence of US Naval harbor defense units contributes greatly to effective, responsive security. In minor ports, such as Phan Rang and Phan Thiet, however, only limited support is provided by US Navy surveillance craft. Harbor security responsibilities for these areas were assigned to Cam Ranh Bay Support Command, which does not have adequate organic assets to perform this mission. Repeated attempts to obtain assistance in the form of US Naval swift boats and military police craft are often negated by a higher priority demand upon these assets.

(c) Improvement is required in the responsiveness of the supply system to requests for equipment in support of defensive responsibilities. Because of the very nature of logistical support activities, personnel and equipment requirements for these elements were established at an absolute minimum. Consequently, LSA's lacked the necessary equipment and manpower needed to respond to a defensive mission assigned by the local defense coordinator and the requisitioning base for internal defensive improvements.

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7. Command Relationships.

a. The Cam Ranh Bay Support Command has relationships with several headquarters in MR II (South) by virtue of its position as the principal coordinator and provider of wholesale and retail logistical support in this area and by the role it has been assigned as the Installation Defense Coordinator for Cam Ranh Peninsula. The Command has dealings with virtually every Allied command in the MR II (South).

b. Relationships with tenant US Air Force, Navy and Army units on Cam Ranh Peninsula have been characterized by a recognition of the common effort and an extremely cooperative attitude. The effective rapport established at the working level during the continuous operations of joint defense coordination for the peninsula is manifested in the Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC) which is collocated with my headquarters. The JDOC is tri-service staffed and reflects the vigorous command emphasis being exerted by the respective commanders of the services.

c. Relationships between the several LSA Commanders and their Installation Defense Coordinators have yielded solutions to the LSA security problems.

d. To facilitate the conduct of our primary mission of providing logistical support to US and FWMA Forces in MR II (South), I have taken special actions to insure that an aggressive and continuous liaison is established and maintained with all major supported units. I personally attended IFTV staff conferences weekly as a participant. My staff conducts assistance visits with customers served by the LSA's and locally in the Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang areas.

8. Relationships with Other Free World Military Assistance Forces: We provide supply support to the Republic of Korea Forces. These include the 9th ROK Division, the ROK Field Force Headquarters, and the 100th Logistical Command. We also provide supply support to a squadron of Australians at Phan Rang. The 30th ROK Regiment of the 9th ROK Division provides security at the upper end of the peninsula at Cam Ranh Bay and on the Cam Tho Peninsula, the western part of the harbor area. Close cooperation and coordination is effected by personal contact.

9. Relationships with the Vietnamese Government and Vietnamization:

a. We are continuing to work closely with the officials of the Cam Ranh Special Sector, local villages and those beyond the limits of the Cam Ranh Sector. Through the Civil Affairs Officer of the Support Command and coordinated programs originating from the battalion level, community relations have been strengthened and expanded. Construction at the village level is made possible through an aggressive program to make available usable materials generated by uncrating at the depot as well as other salvageable excess materials. Considerable effort has been extended through self-help aid visits to the Cam Ranh Village. Assistance to the villagers at Ba Ngoi in the form of repair of fishing craft and renovation of the village pier at Cam Ranh Village benefits the townspeople in the conduct of their trades. Refugee camps, although

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developed to a large extent, still receive a large share of the help and assistance we provide. This helps the villagers considerably in their pursuit of a better life.

b. Perhaps the most important contribution that we have been able to make is the emphasis that has been placed on training the people in new skills through formal schooling and on-the-job training. We are quite proud of the stevedores that graduated from our own stevedore training course. So fast have they advanced that Support Command trained stevedore crews now account for approximately one-third of all the cargo tonnage handled in Cam Ranh Port. All cargo handled at the Sealand Pier is accomplished by the Vietnamese. At Vinnell, Vietnamese workers are replacing third country nationals at an ever-increasing rate in many skilled areas formerly reserved for skilled Western workers. In the specific area of ARVNization and Vietnamization, I have assigned a field grade officer to the sole task of ARVNization. Through a series of meetings and visits an excellent rapport has been established between the leadership and staff of the Support Command and the V Area Logistical Command (ALC) (ARVN). We are now deeply involved with formal training, an aggressive on-the-job training program and extensive cross-training through Instruct and Advise (I&A) Teams which visit various ARVN units in MR II (South). We are particularly proud of the "joint" tactical and logistical operations in which we have participated. At Ban Me Thuot, US Forces now draw ammunition from an Ammo Supply Point operated exclusively by the ARVN. In fact, the ASP serves both ARVN and US Forces. The US Forces receiving Class V support from the ARVN ASP in turn support the ARVN tactical operations in that area. We are presently training ARVN to take over the retail POL points located throughout the MR II (South) area. Eventually the several miniports we operate at the LSAs and at Gia Nghia will be operated by ARVN Forces and like the ASP at Ban Me Thuot, will serve both ARVN and US Forces. In terms of scope, the turnover of the Port of Nha Trang is the largest venture ever undertaken. Takeover involves the receipt, clearance of the port and complete documentation of all cargo received at the port, in addition to outloading. To date the ARVN are performing the complete process for their own and US Special Forces cargo coming through Nha Trang. Our contractors are playing an important part. Their role and the Vietnamese augmentation we are making in our individual units will in time serve as the indicator when the Vietnamese can assume our role in the total conduct of the counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam.

10. Problem Areas. Following are major problem areas encountered and identified during the period 16 October 1969 to 16 September 1970:

a. The lack of an organic engineer capability seriously diminishes the operational capability of this command. The lack of a "fix-it" capability has caused many mission facilities to deteriorate from lack of "outside" engineer troop or contractor capability to perform much needed repairs and maintenance. Examples include the barge off-loading pier at South Beach, Cam Ranh Port and the LST Ramp at Phan Thiet. The slowness of the "system" to react to the requirement to repair a facility has been the cause of reduced efficiency at the sites noted and at other activities. The lack of an in-house capability to alleviate POL bulk storage leak problems has caused the loss of thousands of

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barrels of bulk POL storage capability at Cam Ranh Bay. For a complex as large and important as Cam Ranh Bay, it is my recommendation that a capability be placed in the Support Command or dedicated to this Command for the performance of tasks that I have noted. Maintenance is a continuous requirement and as such must receive continuous attention and commitment. This problem will increase with current and projected cuts in funds available to PA&E.

b. During the period that I have commanded, we have committed a larger effort to direct operational logistical support than during previous months. The absence of a traditional organic logistical support structure within Task Force South has caused the Support Command to perform not only as the Corps level Support Command but also, in many instances, as the brigade level support activity as well. Task Force South is a provisional brigade headquarters that controls the activities of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech), the 2nd Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry and the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (AM). The entire TF headquarters which commands and controls these three battalion size organizations consists of 38 personnel. No support battalion (or equivalent) is provided and except for the LSA-Phan Thiet, LSA Phan Rang and a recently established provisional supply point at Song Mao, the TF has no organic means of supporting the battalions beyond the capability possessed by the battalions themselves. In a larger sense, the lack of an organic logistical support element at the TF level means that I am retailing below the battalion in most cases. A solution that I purpose is to tailor such "task forces" to include normal minimal support and "trains capability" that a brigade size unit in the field would have. Such a provision means that the tactical unit is better supported and we in turn can more efficiently perform our job.

c. The recent completion of METROMEDIA, the complete realignment of IFFV Artillery in MR II, has alleviated many of the problems with the battery support formerly provided. However, despite METROMEDIA, there still remain many areas where the Artillery could assist by employing the capability of their service batteries more fully.

d. The lack of organic aviation in the Support Command, which encompasses an area larger than all of MR III and entails perhaps as many as or more retail logistical locations than any Support Command in Vietnam, is seriously detrimental to the effective command and control and normal operation of the Command. Some relief has been obtained in the movement of maintenance repair parts by air through Operation OTTER. The OTTER Program utilizes dedicated OTTER and C7A aircraft obtained through Headquarters, IFFV. Twice weekly flights are conducted to the LSAs at Ban Me Thuot, Dalat, Phan Thiet and Bao Loc. Statistics for the period February 1970 (start of the program) to July 1970 are shown in Inclosure 13 to this report.

e. I am deeply concerned with the lack of inventory control that is exercised at the LSAs and the tactical units we support from these LSAs. I strive to maintain a "stockage" level at the LSAs for Class I, POL and other items of supply. These levels are based on requirements, but at the same time the customer units are in many cases "maintaining" a stock for that unit which exceeds

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the level that I am managing at the LSA. What is required is communication between the customer and the LSA to insure that forward overstocking, be it at the customer unit location or LSA, is not permitted to take place. An effective "inventory in motion" will serve to reduce stocks forward, reduce the facilities and equipment to store and handle these supplies, and reduce the personnel required to dispense these items.

f. In my capacity as the Installation Coordinator, I must rely completely on support from outside the Support Command to coordinate and execute the security of the peninsula. All peninsula defense coordination is conducted through the Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC). During times of emergency or when enemy or suspected persons are spotted either as "fishermen" or as "swimmers", or when air assistance is required, the JDOC has, at times, experienced long time delays or in some situations no response to the call for assistance at all. In general, the absence of a timely response to the call for helicopters to illuminate or place suppressive fire has, I believe, given the aggressor an opportunity to accomplish his mission or egress from the area unscathed. Response to requests for watercraft is quite important as the presence of swimmers and watercraft moving in or through restricted areas must, by the very nature of the situation, receive an instant reaction. The JDOC to be effective must be able to call for assistance and gain response at times almost instantaneously. I am concerned because as we redeploy combat forces and as the frequency of probes appears to be increasing, the timeliness in response becomes increasingly more important.

g. I am disturbed at the hesitancy that our soldiers have in setting aside their machines when either the enemy situation or inopportunities of employing the machine demands we do things manually. I support a Cavalry Squadron and my observations are that many equipment losses and much damage are incurred because we try running down a single VC with a tank, or we use tanks as mine detectors, etc. The fundamentals of basic soldiering are sometimes set aside in favor of using the wrong tool, while trying to get the job done. In terms of fighting the enemy with tactical vehicles, too small results are being attained when with basic small unit formations and airmobile assault tactics, we could achieve much more at a lower materiel and manpower cost. The bypass of fundamentals occurs also among support troops. Deliberate failures to perform routine maintenance and the lack of minimal care shortens the expected life of a piece of equipment, but, even more, causes a deterioration of discipline and order that is required for lasting and effective military accomplishment. Coupled with the latter aspect is the corresponding failure to place and fix responsibility in all instances. It seems when something goes wrong, it was the "other fellow's" responsibility, and no one can determine who the other fellow might be.

h. As a former combat infantryman, I am disturbed at the excessive consumption of artillery ammunition and munitions in what is generally labelled "harassing and interdiction fires". The logistical implication and impact caused by excessive artillery ammunition expenditures are fantastic. When the Commanding General, I Field Force-Vietnam announced several months ago that unobserved H&I fires were prohibited, ammunition consumption dropped more than 50% with no appreciable reduction in reported body count.

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1. Cam Ranh Sector Security.

(1) The Cam Ranh Bay Logistical Installation is almost exclusively dependent on local Allied and Vietnamese security forces for the security beyond the installation. The Cam Ranh Bay Logistical Complex is secured from without by a variety of non-US Military and para-military forces. Comprising these forces within the Cam Ranh Special Sector are elements of the ROKA National Police and local MACV, CORDS and other intelligence agencies. The total intelligence gathering potential in the immediate Cam Ranh Bay area is unlimited.

(2) On a daily basis the Cam Ranh Peninsula Joint Defense Operation Center (JDOC) receives reports of sightings of suspected enemy personnel ranging in size from a few casually dressed individuals carrying individual weapons to company size formations equipped with a complete complement of individual and crew-served weapons. It disturbs me that we know of the locations of the enemy's secret zones in the Cam Ranh area where rocket, mortar, and sapper attacks are launched, but even with considerable allied and Vietnamese Security Forces present, the attacks are permitted to continue in frequency and intensity almost unchallenged. It is my observation that the combined effort of the several intelligence and military organizations must be more closely coordinated and controlled. The communications and intelligence potential in the Cam Ranh area should not permit the recurrence of repeated enemy attacks from the same area to go unthwarted. Separate Allied Security Forces should not be permitted to withhold information of importance to the defense posture for the entire Cam Ranh Bay Special Sector. Rapidity of response in terms of resources commitment, speed in obtaining area clearance when sighting reports are received, and an improved integration and coordination of all available fires and communications will serve to force the enemy to pay a higher price for future aggressive acts against allied installations in the Cam Ranh area. The administrative and politically based delays to more rapid reaction to confirmed enemy sightings and mortar and rocket launch sites places the Cam Ranh Bay Logistical Complex in a very tenuous position. With US Security Forces redeploying at an increasing rate, a more coordinated intelligence and security effort is required.

11. Lessons Learned.

a. Pattern of Enemy Action: The enemy has cunning and intelligence. Moreover, he knows what we are doing. To compound things even further, he seems to know what we will do under a given set of conditions. The enemy has put these facts together and since last summer has committed himself to a variety of diversions before launching a major confrontation against the Cam Ranh Peninsula. In the conduct of sapper activities against a variety of logistical targets on the peninsula, the lessons to be learned are that one must not over-react. Communications and reporting must be maintained during all conditions. Through the experience cited above, we have altered our defense plan to provide listening posts and forward points backed up with mobile reaction forces that can be deployed on short notice. In addition, increased alert readiness is maintained continuously and constant checking by all commanders is the rule. As the presence of US Forces becomes less pronounced, increased frequency of attacks, mainly standoff in nature, can also be expected.

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b. **Logistical Organization and Procedure:** As a means of adding emphasis to mission logistical support, the Deputy Commander has been designated coordinator of the "logistics providing" elements of the staff and forms a single point of coordination with G-4, USARV.

c. **Logistics Economy:**

(1) The conduct of the effort by the US has bypassed the traditions of the past in too many cases resulting in the wanton waste of supplies, ammunition, and equipment. Carelessness, irresponsibility and, perhaps deepest felt, the failure to do even minimal maintenance on equipment have caused this war to cost the American taxpayer more than he should be expected to pay. The faults committed span the spectrum of deficiencies. The lesson observed stems, I believe, from the environment we have created in Vietnam. The shortness of the tour, the short tenure in positions of responsibility - too short often to cause the officer to live with what he has created, have caused this to become a very expensive and "sloppy" war. I find the engineers concerned primarily with kilometers of asphalt laid as the criteria for gauging leadership and quality of command; the combat commander with body count and other criteria to measure the same qualities; and sometimes even my own commanders measure the "end" without regard for the "means" to attain that "end". The disregard for proper maintenance practices is a contradiction to the American standard of development. I become concerned over the obvious crack in discipline when I see Korean combat units and the excellent manner in which they maintain their areas and equipment. The contrast is alarming. In many cases they have received equipment that we have outgrown and which following rebuild was issued to their units. What have we taught them that we ourselves have forgotten?

(2) In my experience in ammunition economy, I have witnessed excessive waste by combat forces during and following combat operations. We have supported numerous brigade and smaller operations during the past year. During this period we have seen new ammunition dumped on the ground to obtain the container for another purpose. The inability of the same troops to associate cost with their actions is at best quite alarming.

(3) On the positive side, I have obtained very satisfactory results from the partnership which has been established with salvage materiel dealers in assisting them to extract and remove their salvage purchases from the PDO Yard to the Port for export. The statistics accrued to date clearly demonstrate that even minimal cooperation can produce quite impressive results.

d. **Supply.**

(1) Implementation of the techniques demonstrated during the TC/SA study and more recently in the increased frequency of SLAM ammunition shipments to Qui Nhon, using Roll-On/Roll-Off, comes closest to true "inventory in motion" than ever accomplished before in the Vietnam conflict. The result of this effort has been lower inventories for the Qui Nhon Support Command at a minimal increase in effort by this command.

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(2) Return of reparable is a necessary pre-requisite for the successful operation of the Vinnell contractor operated maintenance activity at Cam Ranh Bay for the in-country rebuilding of major vehicular assemblies. More than once the production lines have come to a halt because reparable have been mis-routed or discarded rather than returned to the "system" for rebuild/repair and subsequent return to the supply system.

(3) Mechanization of the supply system dictates that the customer conform his operation to be compatible with the central depot system. Considerable loss in customer convenience and in turn the fill of requisitions results from the failure of the requisitioner to reconcile computer printouts, etc. and return them to the "computer" for validation. Formal instruction and the distribution of literature on reconciliation procedures and responsibilities have overcome part of the problem, but the rapid turnover of personnel requires continuous efforts in this area.

e. Maintenance.

(1) We have observed that one of the primary gauges of a unit's ability to perform effective maintenance is the completeness of the OVE tools and equipment at the operator and organizational maintenance level. When we examine a unit, I have instructed my staff to judge their total "maintenance organization" to include the personnel and materiel the unit has to perform organizational maintenance.

(2) The lesson all of us learn again and again is that the maintenance posture of a unit is more dependent on the commander than on any other single factor.

f. Transportation.

(1) The absence of advanced manifests still precludes the attainment of a fully efficient port operation. The port must know what is coming in terms of vessel berthing requirements and the cargo it bears.

(2) The "friend" of the Support Command has been the airplane. During the past nine months I have made maximum use of the C7A provided me by IFFV to augment convoy shipments and fill the gap during critical periods. During the recent Cambodian operations, when all C-130 and C-123 aircraft were diverted to support Allied Forces operating across the border, the C7A was called upon and provided the major transport effort for movement of perishable rations to the outlying Logistical Support Activities. Serious consideration should be given to the full time dedication of C7A type aircraft to the Support Command to transport repair parts and perishable rations, to recover reparable from the field and to return them upon completion of the necessary repairs.

(3) Beginning last February (1970) I started receiving a dedicated OTTER aircraft for the delivery of essential maintenance repair parts to the LSAs

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at Ban Me Thuot, Dalat, Phan Thiet and Bao Loc and the return of reparable and requisitions to Cam Ranh Bay. Through this simple process, I have been able to reduce by more than 50% the order-to-ship time for requisitions and by 65% the time required to return repaired signal equipment. During the first two months of operation, the OTTER carried more than 30 S/T of repair parts to the four LSAs. Their experience combined with that of the C7A noted above and the requirement for command and control aircraft for the Command Group and the major subordinate commanders and staff substantiates the valid requirement that a support command such as this, with the responsibility for more than 15,500 square miles, have at least a minimal organic aircraft element. Presently, there are no aircraft assigned to the command.

12. Highlights of My Period of Command. I have saved this section of my debriefing until last for two reasons: first, because it serves as a summary of the entire report and of what I accomplished while commanding the Support Command, and second, because these events have served to influence our present operations. It is my opinion they will serve to influence future operations and logistical support provided by the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

a. Ban Me Thuot (Quang Duc and Darlac Province) Operational Support. Our participation in this Joint US - ARVN operation was good for the command. It enabled us to flex our muscles and test new support techniques for what has since become a familiar type of operation. Working side-by-side with the Corps tactical headquarters, we were able to establish rapport and confidence and, as a result, make a definite contribution to the military victory that was enjoyed by the joint allied force. We proved that we could intensify our support of one location without diminishing our support of our other areas of responsibility. Smaller operations of the same type have been supported using the several techniques and procedures learned during the "Ban Me Thuot" operation. As noted in the after-action report, we made extensive use of dedicated C-7A aircraft which we used to fill the gaps between line haul convoys and heavy lift air deliveries.

b. Test of Containerized Shipments of Ammunition (TOCSA). For many years the military has used containers to move cargo and all sorts of supplies except ammunition. The purpose of TOCSA was to demonstrate that ammunition also had a place in containerized delivery. Using "off-the-shelf" hardware and standard SEALAND containers we proved beyond a doubt that ammunition could be packed in a container in CONUS and unstuffed at a fire base somewhere near the Cambodian border without individual round handling, merely by moving a single container. The success of this test underlies the impetus given to expanding our area of responsibility to the Qui Nhon Support Command area. The efforts of TOCSA have all but erased any doubts that containerization truly is the dream come true of the military transporter - including movement to the forward area.

c. Vinnell Maintenance Facility. The true value and benefits obtained from this facility are a function of the management provided by my staff and the quality of the Vinnell Corporation as a maintenance service contractor.

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Combined, these qualifications have produced for the support command and USARV a source of near-new major assemblies for most classes of wheeled vehicles and higher echelon support of all engineer equipment organic to Military Region II South. The ability of Vinnell to influence our overall maintenance posture through the several programs that I have established during the past few months will effect the future maintenance of this command area and other areas as well. Vinnell's ability to respond to short fuse requirements lends testimony to the flexibility and efficiency built into the contract. An extension of the maintenance overhaul aspects are the advantages being enjoyed from that portion of the Vinnell contract which provides for forklift service support. The results of this operation have made it possible for us to reduce our forklift inventory and at the same time enable us to have more equipment available to do our job. I am impressed with the performance of Vinnell in this instance and with the overall worth that a commercial contractor has on the in-theater operation of the depot maintenance within a logistical support command. The real worth is in the "organic" capability that makes our maintenance support program almost self-sufficient. The size of Vinnell at Cam Ranh Bay is such that its operation can be tailored to meet whatever requirement arises. This command would be at a loss without this maintenance support capability.

d. Supply Support of Qui Nhon Support Command. By direction of the former 1st Logistical Command, the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command has been tasked to support the Qui Nhon Support Command with an ever-increasing number of classes of supply support. Beginning in January 1970 with back-up Class VII support from Cam Ranh Bay, the command is now at the point where we are supplying all Class VII materiel from Cam Ranh Bay and from a pre-stock storage area located at Qui Nhon Depot. I was also tasked to provide Class III (Packaged) and 7,000 S/T of Class V using Roll-On/Roll-Off and break-bulk techniques. To date there have been no major problems and only negligible impact is felt on the rest of my support command operation in MR II (South).

e. Operation Binh Tay (Cambodia). With little forewarning this support command participated in and influenced the success of the over-the-border operations in both MR II and NW MR III into Cambodia. The variety of tasks performed and the response from all quarters of the command was magnificent. Indeed the victory by allied forces was the result of every component doing its share and then some. I am proud that my command had a part in the battle and can share in the joy of the victorious.

f. Re-enlistment Program. Since October 1969, this Support Command was awarded the First Place Re-enlistment Plaque more often than any of the other three support commands combined. Since October 1969 the command attained or exceeded the assigned re-enlistment objective four times. This accomplishment is a credit and a tribute to the hard work and positive leadership present at every level of command.

g. Cost Reduction Program. Greater economies and high quality performance are the objectives of every commander. One of the best methods for reducing cost is to engage the creative effort of all personnel in seeking

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improvements. By establishing a cost reduction program which included the assignment of a Command Coordinator for the program and assignment of cost reduction responsibility and goals down to battalion and company levels, this command was able to achieve significant savings. Personnel of this command identified, documented, and forwarded approximately \$15.0 million in cost reduction action of 1LC during FY70. Of this amount \$7.7 million was validated by the US Army Audit Agency (AAA) and an additional \$1.8 million was forwarded by USARV to USARPAC for further consideration and possible validation.

h. Vietnamization/ARVNization.

(1) Commanders in all the Services in Vietnam can be proud of the overall results of the efforts made to date in ARVNizing the war in Vietnam, or as some have said "turning over more of what we are doing to the Vietnamese".

(2) Entire fleets of aircraft, watercraft and land vehicles have been transferred to the Vietnamese Armed Forces and many more civilians are now employed in positions formerly staffed with US or Third Country Nationals (TCN).

(3) Within the Support Command we have engaged in a myriad of Vietnamization and ARVNization actions.

(a) Approximately one of every three tons of cargo that passes through the Cam Ranh Port is handled by Support Command trained Vietnamese stevedores.

(b) In all of my maintenance areas I have Vietnamese military and civilian personnel working side-by-side doing on-the-job training with my own TOE maintenance personnel.

(c) Major facility turnovers and mergers have been accomplished and will continue in order to enable joint operations to extend in scope for many of the logistics services we provide. At Ban Me Thuot, a US ammunition support point (ASP) was merged into an ARVN ASP resulting in significant savings of US personnel and handling equipment. In the area of retail POL operations we have Vietnamese military operating with us at each of the US operated helicopter refuel points that are located at provincial capitals. The most spectacular event, one which culminated a long series of negotiations with MACV, USARV and other US and Allied Headquarters, was the ARVNization of the Port of Nha Trang. This turnover began with individual and small unit training and assistance designed to acquaint the Vietnamese with modern techniques and equipment. Presently, the ARVN are handling their own cargo and all US Special Forces cargo, to include documentation.

(d) Intensified training is now underway to train POL operating personnel from the V Area Logistical Command (ARVN) located at Nha Trang for their eventual assumption of the larger POL terminal at Nha Trang.

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(4) Two major civilian contractor oriented operations that are heavily engaged in training mainly Vietnamese civilians are the Vinnell operated marine maintenance activity and the general support contractor operated vehicle and equipment maintenance facility.

(5) I am very proud of the accomplishments we have achieved to date and the very fine rapport we have established with the Vietnamese civilian and military communities. More important though, I am very excited about future programs and the acceleration of current projects.

(6) Recently we received new encouragement when ARVN agreed to discuss a "package" offer of the Yankee Ammunition Storage Area and a family housing development nearby for ARVN personnel and their dependents. Once trained personnel can be procured, I am prepared to replace US personnel in many of my units with local national civilians. The expansion of such a program will broaden the LN training base and in turn make the local people more "saleable" on the labor market. My goal is to attain a viable Vietnamization program that addresses military and civilian personnel and skills in all areas of my command. At Cam Ranh Bay the opportunities are unlimited. The only restraint is the imagination and interest level we are willing to accept in the conduct of the program.



R. DEL MAR
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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CTZ MAJOR ROAD NET & AIRFIELDS

AIRFIELDS

G-130 OPEN
 G-130 CLOSED
 G-123 OPEN
 G-123 CLOSED
 G-7A OPEN
 G-7A CLOSED

LIGHT AIRCRAFT AIRFIELD
 MAJOR HELIPORT

ROAD SURFACE
 MACV STANDARD ROAD
 CLASS 31 ROAD
 CLASS 10 ROAD
 CLASS 5 ROAD

STATUS OF ROAD NOT KNOWN OR CLOSED

NATIONAL ROUTES (OL)
 INTERPROVINCIAL ROUTES (LTL)
 PROVINCIAL ROUTES (TL)
 SUPPLEMENTARY ROUTES (OTE)
 COMMUNAL ROUTES (OL)

OTHER FEATURES


INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
 PROVINCE BOUNDARY
 PROVINCE NAME

Notes

For detailed information on road 130, see
 G-130 and G-130-1 (G-130-1 is not a map).
 Route Classification and Bridge Number Book.
 (Note: Data is not for use in the field and
 is not to be used for navigation or for other
 purposes.)

1. Road is not authorized for use.
2. Road is not authorized for use.

Scale 1:2,000,000



BASE COURSE COMPLETED
 SUB-GRADE PREPARATION

COMPILED BY 1 FORCE ENGINEER SECTION
 DRAFTED BY 5004 ENGR CO (TOPG) COMPT 10 69
 TO ORDER BLIND REQUEST TO 5004 ENGR CO (TOPG)
 PRINTED BY 5004 ENGR CO (TOPG) COMPT 10 69

INCLOSURE to Incl 1

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US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY


SUPPORTED STRENGTH JULY 1970

US ARMY	-----	36,776
US AIR FORCE	-----	11,468
US NAVY	-----	2,865
US COAST GUARD	-----	7
REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES	-----	15,916
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCES	-----	302
US CONTRACTOR ACTIVITIES	-----	<u>983</u>
		68,317

INCLOSURE 2 to Incl 1

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, CAM RANH BAY





INCLOSURE 3 to Incl 1

LEGEND


--- STAFF SUPERVISION

[] ADVISORY






LA - Liaison Activity LSA - Logistical Support Activity




* ATTACHED UNITS.



US ARMY MARINE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY

ORGANIZATION CHART



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MARINE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY VIETNAM

**OVERHAUL REPAIRS FOR PERIOD
OCTOBER 1969 THROUGH JULY 1970**

LANDING CRAFT MECHANIZED	(LCM-8)	20
LANDING CRAFT MECHANIZED	(LCM-6)	3
LANDING CRAFT UTILITY	(LCU)	10
BARGE CARGO	(BC)	25
SMALL TUG		1
J-BOAT		1
BARGE	(BK)	<u>2</u>
TOTAL NUMBER OF VESSELS OVERHAULED		62

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-GO-0

30 January 1970

SUBJECT: After-Action Report - Logistical Support to Tactical Operations
in Southern II Corps Tactical Zone (U)

Commanding General
1st Logistical Command
ATTN: AVCA GO-0
APO 96384

1. (C) PURPOSE.

a. The overall purpose of this after-action report is to summarize the logistical support provided to IFFV through the Logistical Support Activity (LSA) at Ban Me Thuot, Petroleum Supply Point (SP) at Gia Nghia and the Contact Team (CT) at Nhon Co. In addition, an attempt will be made to recapitulate pertinent statistics assembled during the course of the support to the tactical operation in support of the Joint US - ARVN tactical operation that took place in SW II Corps during the late August to late December 1969 timeframe.

b. This after-action report is intended to assemble in a single document those aspects of coordination and lessons learned that permitted the support of this tactical operation to be conducted in a relatively smooth and efficient manner.

2. (C) DISCUSSION.

a. The timeframe of this after-action report is from 31 August 1969 through 31 December 1969. This period covers the initial buildup at Ban Me Thuot which began with marked increased enemy activity in the Bu Prang - Nhon Co - Ban Me Thuot area in southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone and the request for reconstitution of the ASP at BMT; and terminates with the departure of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to northern II Corps which coincided with the close of calendar year 1969. The operation was never given a specific name.

b. The principal US Forces supported during the timeframe are contained in Annex A to this report.

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in Southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone (U)

c. Extracts from the Daily Journal of the Operations Division, ACofS Security, Plans and Operations, this headquarters, are contained in Annex B.

d. The principal activities that stand out during the total period of support are noted below:

(1) Initial announcement by IFFV of the enemy buildup and request that the BMT ASP be reconstituted. Increased helicopter density from 7/17th Combat Aviation Battalion. (Late August - early September)

(2) Announcement of increased buildup in the Bu Prang Special Forces - CIDG Camp area that threatens the camp. Request for increased stocks of POL and Class V at Ban Me Thuot and establishment of a refueling point at Nhon Co (later to include a rearm point). (Late October thru mid-November)

(3) Movement of the 3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (Air Mobile) and 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from Phan Thiet and Northern II Corps, respectively, and the increased requirements for their support. Supported strength exceeded 5,000 during this period. (November timeframe)

(4) Phase-out of US activity and departure of 3/506th and 1st Brigade, 4th Division. Adjustment of LSA stocks and retrograde of excess stocks from Ban Me Thuot to Cam Ranh Bay. Close out of Nhon Co Contact Team. (Late December and continuing)

e. Observations and Lessons Learned:

(1) It is significant that there be single points of contact at this headquarters and the tactical headquarters receiving/coordinating the logistical support of the committed combat elements. During this operation the Operations Division, SP&O and the Supply Division, G-4, IFFV were points of coordination between our two headquarters. Through the judicious use of a Liaison Officer this headquarters was able to create an interface for the earliest receipt of requirements and jointly plan for the logistical support that was provided to and from the Ban Me Thuot LSA.

(2) As a corollary to the above paragraph, by establishing a close rapport with the tactical headquarters throughout the operation, this headquarters was able to plan concurrently and in fact contribute significantly to the logistical planning, establishment of requirements and solutions to problem areas.

(3) The use of small convoys on a near-daily basis between Cam Ranh Bay and the Ban Me Thuot LSA provided responsiveness to daily requirements and flexibility in this Command's responsibilities to sustain support

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to five other LSA's and other locations while providing support to Ban Me Thuot. Additional factors pertinent to the conduct of convoy operations during the support operations to the Ban Me Thuot area are as noted below:

(a) Resupply to Ban Me Thuot was accomplished entirely with organic assets.

(b) Resupply was accomplished without adverse effect on the resupply activities to other LSA's.

(c) Adjustments to include switching modes of transport were implemented to provide additional highway assets to support increased operations to Ban Me Thuot.

(d) Assets normally assigned to port and beach clearing were diverted without an adverse effect on port and beach operations.

(e) During the period of near daily convoys to Ban Me Thuot, only a minimal quantity of cargo passed RDD. To date all accrued "red" cargo has been delivered.

(f) Small convoys were conducted to Ban Me Thuot to:

1. Minimize the number of transportation units committed, while maximizing the effective utilization of available assets.

2. Provide effective and timely response to daily requirements from the forward area.

3. Prevent overtaxing of the receipt capability of the Ban Me Thuot LSA. The number of task vehicles assigned each convoy were gauged against the receipt, accounting, and warehousing capability of the LSA for daily shipments of dry and bulk fuel cargo.

4. Prevent traffic congestion in and around the Ban Me Thuot area. It was specifically requested by the MACV Advisors and IFFV that convoys entering and leaving Ban Me Thuot be kept to a minimum and limited in size.

(4) During the course of the Support Command support to IFFV, the latter requested that certain items of materiel be prepositioned at the Ban Me Thuot LSA for replacement of combat losses in the area of operations. The list of the items requested is contained in Annex C. Items prepositioned were selected on the basis of equipment density in the AO, criticality to the operation and adherence to the criteria set by the CG, IFFV that combat

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in Southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone (U)

losses be replaced within a two (2) hour timeframe. Release of controlled items followed existing depot release procedures.

(5) During the early phase of the operation the 17th Combat Aviation Group (CAG) operated the rearm point at Nhon Co. Because of operational and control problems at Nhon Co, IFFV requested CRBSC dispatch a CT from the BMT - LSA for the continued operation of the JP-4 POL refuel point and operation of the rearm point for helicopter ammunition. Principal DODIC's were A-165 (minigun), B-572 (40mm link), H-459 (2.75" flechette rockets), and H-490 (2.75" HE rockets). A lesson learned immediately was that the rearm point and refuel point be separated for operation as two distinct facilities. This serves to avoid congestion and provides the necessary dispersion to reduce the probability of large materiel losses in the event of an enemy attack.

(6) Because of the close liaison and parallel planning on the part of this headquarters and IFFV, it was possible to "prepare the battlefield" by moving stocks of materiel in anticipation of future requirements. This enabled the tactical commander to employ his forces with available materials at times when his forces were available, and avoided the necessity of time delays while waiting for supplies to be delivered.

(7) A summary of the statistics collected during the intensive support period of 29 October 1969 through 31 December 1969, inclusive, are as follows:

(a) Total number of line haul convoys conducted	37
(b) Total number of S&P trips	909
(c) Total S&P tonnage hauled (STONS)	9,426
(d) Total 5000 gal tankers hauled	524
(e) Total fuel (bulk) hauled (gal)	2,620,000
(f) Average dry cargo (STONS) hauled per convoy	255
(g) Average POL (gal) hauled per convoy	70,800
(h) Breakout of POL delivered:	

JP-4	1,610,000
AVGAS	115,000
MOGAS	345,000
DIESEL	550,000

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in Southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone (U)

(1) Included Class V (STONS)

4,272 Tonnage

(8) A very important resource that contributed significantly to the efficient and timely support to this operation was the ready availability of IFFV dedicated C-7A conventional aircraft. The availability of this mode of transportation made it possible to react almost instantaneously to crash requirements that came in from the forward area. Common user US Air Force aircraft or convoys could not have reacted as effectively as the C-7A aircraft. On more than one occasion aircraft were diverted to Cam Ranh Bay for loading and dispatched to Ban Me Thuot. The real value of this mode is not to be underestimated.

(9) A logistical lesson learned from this first large joint US-ARVN operation in Southern II Corps was that one can no longer estimate the total logistical requirement based solely on the density of "people" and land bound vehicles committed to the operation. In this operation the troop commitment to conduct actual combat operations was minimal. Ground security was provided by the Vietnamese (ARVN, CIDG and/or MIKE Strike Force Battalions). The density of artillery and helicopters committed was disproportionate to the number of US troops in the AO. Large quantities of helicopter and artillery Class V and JP-4 fuel were required on a daily basis and in several areas in the AO. During the height of the operation this command supplied Class III and V to Ban Me Thuot, which operated as a hub for logistical support; to Nhon Co, a C-130 airfield which was used to stage fuel and supplies to Bu Prang, and for the conduct of rearm and refuel operations; to Gia Nghia, which provided a backup for Nhon Co and also sustained the CORDS and other activities in support of the Province Senior Advisor for Quang Duc Province; and to Duc Lap, a CIDG camp which received continuous support throughout most of the operation but at a lower level than Bu Prang and other areas. Forward staging, extensive CH-47 "hook" operations and distributed rearm/refuel points for rotary wing aircraft were quickly integrated into this Support Command's operating repertoire. By supporting such areas as Nhon Co and Gia Nghia with airlift resupply by Special Mission Airlift Requests (SMAR), continuous resupply of JP-4 and helicopter ammunition was assured to these locations. Large scale 500 gallon collapsible drum operations were located at Ban Me Thuot and Nhon Co to support the outlying areas noted above. Continuous resupply of these commodities enabled the total area to be supported from several "hubs", namely Cam Ranh Bay, Ban Me Thuot and other Air Force Bases, as origins for bulk air delivered fuels. The Ban Me Thuot support operation pointed out the requirement for new resupply techniques to include instant resupply techniques needed for "float" or "swing" battalions and brigades. No longer can resupply be staged over a period of days. Supplies must be ready for drop on a daily basis, be delivered with the artillery tubes from which they will be fired, and in general be continuous so as to preclude having more supplies at a particular location than the commander

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of that area can secure within a tight perimeter or afford to lose if his area is overrun and evacuation is directed. The concept of "inventory in motion" is obviously applicable and must be developed for forward support areas. A problem exists in that artillery units that must maintain sufficient stocks for sustained firing if resupply is delayed for up to several days. The danger of overstocking is apparent in light of the increased danger of major destruction of the Fire Support Base in the event of a direct hit by enemy artillery or mortar fire. Additionally, rapid extraction from the FSB becomes increasingly more difficult.

(10) During early December the CG, IFFV, directed that a new Fire Support Base be constructed in the vicinity of the former FSB Kate, near Bu Prang. Because of the absence of a standard design of a FSB, huge quantities of timbers and other construction and barrier materials were airlifted from CRB to Nhon Co for later transshipment to the new FSB. It was later determined that the quantities shipped were unbalanced because they were not able to provide a complete structure, and in quantities beyond the immediate capability of the constructing force. The net result was that valuable USAF assets were committed to haul materials from Cam Ranh Bay to Nhon Co in quantities far in excess of the constructing units immediate capability and the capability of CH-47/CH-54 aircraft to transship from Nhon Co to the FSB site. In this instance it is obvious that a set of standard FSB designs are required to facilitate future FSB construction in a more orderly and efficient manner.

(11) It was apparent during the support of this operation that current planning data contained in such common references as FM 101-10-1/2; USARPAC Class V Forecasts, etc. were not accurate in forecasting requirements for artillery and helicopter Class V stockage requirements at the BMT - ASP and at rearm points in the AO. On more than one occasion a "10 day" stockage level was removed by a single request from an air cavalry troop making a one or two day pickup from the BMT - ASP during the height of the operation. Requirements for artillery were based on the Ben Het - Dak To (69) experience as 75 rounds/tub/day for 105mm howitzer and 60 rounds/tube/day for larger tube sizes. Supported tube densities varied during the course of the operation. Maximum supported tubes; 35 - 105mm How; 8 - 155mm How; 2 ea - 8 in How; 3 - 175mm gun.

(12) It became apparent early during the period of intensive support that the existing requisitioning procedure that employed a formal Supply Directive issued by the ACoS Supply was cumbersome, overtaxing on the Supply staff, and reduced this staff section to that of an operator. To alleviate the additional workload on the ACoS Supply the responsibility was placed on the 54th General Support Group for this action. In turn the Group prepared and set into operation (during the latter phase of the support operation) a procedure for the expeditious process of emergency requests for materiel to include direct coordination with respective

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in Southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone (U)

commodity managers at the Cam Ranh Depot. A copy of the procedure is contained in Annex D.

(13) If a similar operation is to take place in the same area of operations or in an area where a large dependency is placed on the helicopter as a primary resupply mode, it is recommended that the "battlefield be prepared" by incorporating the following actions into the initial planning:

(a) Plan for the immediate installation of rearm/refuel points at strategically located airfields, especially those that can support C-130 Air Force aircraft. It is more economical to resupply bulk fuel by air with a C-130 than with a C-123. A single sortie by a C-130 can carry 4,000 - 4,500 gal/sortie versus 1,000 - 1,300 gal/sortie with a C-123. Similar ratios exist for bulk cargo shipments. Crews that operate the points should be qualified personnel. In addition, norms of police and efficient operation should be implemented with the initial installation.

(b) Sufficient quantities of 500 gallon collapsible drums should be on hand at all times to support closed-loop containerized refuel operations such as were conducted between Nhon Co and Bu Prang, and Ban Me Thuot and Duc Lap. "It is important that the tools be available when the worker is ready to start work."

(c) Provisions for such "morale" items as fresh fruit and ice cream should be included in the logistical planning. As was demonstrated during this operation these items when pushed to the FSB's proved to be a tremendous morale booster to the troops up front.

(d) For each size force committed to the operation there should be prepared a list of "prepositioned" materiel to be laid at the supporting LSA or Forward Support Element for the quick replacement of combat losses. The quantity and type will depend on the proximity to the nearest depot, urgency for recovery after a combat loss, transportation, etc. - but regardless of conditions, should be included during initial planning and be included in the Operation Order Logistical Annex.

(e) It is imperative that the "new tactic" wherein the US provides long range artillery and helicopter support be promulgated to all concerned so that all understand the varying magnitudes of logistic effort required for Joint US-ARVN operations of the type herein reported. Coupled with this should be the understanding that although land lines communications exist in the AO, the cost of securing/opening these LOC's is not worth the diversion of ARVN tactical combat forces and not within the realm of commitment planned for US Forces in Vietnam during the conduct of the Joint Operations.

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in Southwestern II Corps Tactical Zone (U)

(14) It is incumbent upon the LSA Commander to continuously monitor the status of his stocks and when excesses are generated to institute positive retrograde actions or otherwise adjust his stockage levels. The LSA Commander must maintain continuous liaison with the supported units to obtain information at the earliest possible time of unit moves and relocations. Intensive management of Class I and V is essential to the efficient conduct of logistical support of a tactical operation of this nature. Back-haul must make maximum utilization of empty trailer space from incoming convoys. A positive policy of "reverse flow" must be readily available for rapid implementation when unit relocations lower the population/equipment densities among the units supported.

3. (C) CONCLUSIONS. The overall conduct of this operation was a success for the following reasons:

a. From the outset of increased operations there existed an environment of joint planning, a continuous exchange of information, and mutual rapport between points of contact established between the logistical support headquarters and the corps-level tactical headquarters.

b. All requests for support were channeled through a single office at both headquarters noted above. A single stream of requirements and solutions was established and maintained throughout the operation.

c. Judicious planning and utilization of surface and air transportation provided flexible and timely shipment of all classes of supply.

d. A "can do" attitude at all echelons of this command enabled the SUPCOM Commander to support this operation with a minimal effect on the support required to other points/activities throughout the remainder of this SUPCOM's area of responsibility.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl

1. Task Organization Supported
2. Extracts of Daily Journal
(is attached to 1st Log letter only)
3. List of Prepositioned Materiel
4. 54th Group Supply Procedure

ROBERT W. RETTIG
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

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Annex A (Task Organization Supported)

Task Force FIGHTER

Forward Mobile Staff (Hq, IFFV)

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

1st Bn, 14th Inf

2nd Bn, 35th Inf

Supporting artillery, engineers, combat service support

3rd Battalion, 506th Infantry (Air Mobile)

Supporting artillery

IFFV-Artillery

2nd Bn, 17th Arty (105mm How, tow)

5th Bn, 22nd Arty (8" How/175mm gun, SP)

1st Bn, 92nd Arty (105mm How, tow)

35th Engineer Group (Const)

19th Engr Bn (Cbt)

70th Engr Bn (Cbt)

687th Engr Co (Land Clearing)

17th Combat Aviation Group (CAG)

7th Sqdn, 17th CAG

155th Aviation Co (Asslt Hel)

Composite Co (CH-47, UH-1) (from Pleiku)

Military Assistance Teams

MACV Adv Tm 25

MACV Adv Tm 33

5th US Special Forces Group

INCLOSURE 1 TO INCLOSURE 10

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Annex C (List of Prepositioned Materiel)

In response to an urgent IFFV requirement, the following items were identified for prepositioning at the Ban Me Thuot Logistical Support Activity (LSA). While all the items hereon listed were not actually located at the LSA, these items were cited as requirements and positive supply action was initiated and all items available at the Cam Ranh Bay Depot were positioned at Ban Me Thuot. The items available within the SUPCOM were placed at Ban Me Thuot and remained on the Depot's base file. Prepositioned materiel was hand-receipted to the 54th General Support Group for pre-positioning, proper safeguard and for the performance of the proper and necessary maintenance. Normal release and supply procedures were adhered to throughout the period of operational support for the replacement of combat loss items.

<u>Federal Stock Number</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>U/I</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
1005-605-7710	Machine gun, 7.62mm, M60	ea	1
1005-726-6131	Barrel, cal .50	ea	4
1010-349-4119	Barrel, 40mm	ea	2
1015-322-9752	Howitzer, M101A1, 105mm	ea	1
1025-322-9768	Howitzer, M114A1, 155mm	ea	1
1220-448-0131	FADAC Computer	ea	1
1240-768-7260	Telescope	ea	1
1240-917-6433	Telescope	ea	1
1290-299-6193	Fire Dir Set, 25000m	ea	1
1290-299-6893	Fire Dir Set, 15000m	ea	1
1290-535-7617	Aiming post	ea	6
1290-535-7629	Sighting post, M-14	ea	6
1290-614-0008	Aiming circle	ea	2
1290-719-7156	Quadrant, M1A1	ea	1
1290-764-7761	Fuse setter, M27	ea	1
1290-966-9318	Fuse setter, M63	ea	1
4320-937-6725	Pump, centrifugal	ea	1
5820-497-8554	Antenna set, RC-292	ea	2
5820-892-0871	Radio set, AN/VRC-46	ea	2
5820-930-3724	AN/PRC-77, Radio set	ea	2
5820-949-9909	Control Group	ea	1
5965-682-2796	Headset, H-144/U	ea	2
6115-019-8238	Gen set, 3KW	ea	1
6115-295-2203	Gen set, 1.5KW	ea	1
6115-975-8382	Gen set, 3KW, 28V	ea	1
6685-344-4603	Thermometer, pow temp	ea	4

INCLOSURE 3 TO INCLOSURE 10

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CRB Cir 725-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

Circular
No. 725-1

7 December 1969

Expires 1 November 1970
SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR RESUPPLY
OF CLASSES II, IV AND VII SUPPLIES TO LSA'S

1. Purpose. To define responsibilities and procedures for resupply of Class II, IV and VII supplies to LSA's.
2. Scope. This publication applies to this Headquarters and all subordinate commands.
3. General. Users of this publication are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the publication. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded to this Headquarters, ATTN: AVCA CRB-GL-PO.
4. Responsibilities.
 - a. ACofS, Supply:
 - (1) Monitor the supply transactions of subordinate commands to insure adequate, responsive support to the LSA's and their supported customers.
 - (2) Receive, review and evaluate stockage objective levels at the LSA's and insure that effective resupply is being coordinated and handled as outlined in this circular.
 - (3) Be responsive to the command group on any inquiries in reference to LSA resupply.
 - b. Commanding Officer, 54th General Support Group:
 - (1) Manage, through the LSA commanders, the entire resupply operation for the LSA.
 - (2) Review stockage objectives and usage factors and submit timely requisitions through their logistics office to insure an even flow of supplies to the LSA's.

INCLOSURE 4 TO INCLOSURE 10

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CRB Cir 725-1, dtd 7 Dec 69, Con't

(3) Maintain an informal document register and assign document numbers to requested items for the LSA.

(4) Provide support in II CTZ South for any unit entering the area of responsibility supported by USASUPCOM-CRB.

(5) Follow the detailed procedures outlined in paragraph 5 below.

c. Commanding Officer, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay.

(1) Process replenishment requisitions for LSA's using a special project code and enter the requisition into a normal processing cycle.

(2) Mark the Transportation Control Movement Document (TCMD) and the Materiel Release Order (MRO) with a green arrow enabling the supply handlers and transportation personnel to recognize the items as a special requisition.

(3) Be responsive to emergency requirements by using a walk-thru system.

d. Commanding Officer, 124th Transportation Command and OIC USASUPCOM-CRB-MCC:

(1) Process TCMD's in accordance with the priority system i.e., 05 priority requisition will receive an 02 transportation priority except those TCMD's marked with a green arrow (see c (2) above), will be shipped ahead of all like priorities awaiting shipment to that end station.

(2) Be responsive to shipping priority changes as directed by ACoS, SP&O when the items are needed for emergency resupply.

e. LSA Commander

(1) Be completely responsive to the requirements outlined in paragraph 5.

(2) Take aggressive action to insure that the needs of the units supported by his LSA are obtaining required supplies to insure accomplishment of their mission.

(3) Maintain continuous liaison with customers.

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CRB Cir 725-1, dtd 7 Dec 69, Con't

5. Procedures. The following procedures prescribe the detailed responsibilities and actions of the 54th GS Gp, USAD-CRB, Movements Control Center (MCC) and the 124th Trans Comd for providing Class II, IV and VII supply support (to include pre-stocked LSA items) to units located in the II CTZ South area. The procedures stated in this circular will not be deviated from unless approval is granted by ACofS, Supply, USASUPCOM-CRB, in coordination with ACofS, SP&O.

a. The pre-stocked items will be processed in the following manner:

(1) 54th GS Gp will determine appropriate stockage objectives for each of the push items to be stocked at the LSA.

(2) An informal document register will be maintained by the 54th GS Gp for the purpose of requesting items for the LSA. A document number will be assigned to each request so that it may be processed through normal supply channels.

(a) 8000 - 8199 Ban Me Thuot

(b) 8200 - 8399 Phan Thiet

(c) 8400 - 8599 Dalat

(d) 8600 - 8699 Bao Loc

(e) 8700 - 8799 Phan Rang

(f) 8800 - 8899 Nha Trang

(g) 8900 - 8999 Miscellaneous

(3) The following Activity Address Codes will be used as supplemental address codes for shipment purposes only.

(a) AT87SR Ban Me Thuot

(b) AT87SS Phan Thiet

(c) AT87SN Dalat

(d) AT87SQ Bao Loc

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(e) AT80TT Phan Rang

(f) AT8154 Nha Trang

This Activity Address Code will be placed on the DD Form 1348 by the 54th GS Gp representative initiating the request. Also, the required quantity will be placed on the DD Form 1348 and a 20 day order and ship time (OST) will be allowed for programming purposes.

(4) The DD Form 1348 will be made out in three copies and hand carried by the 54th GS Gp representative to the following activities:

(a) One copy to Class II and IV DSU.

(b) One copy to USAD-CRB, Customer Assistance Office for processing.

(c) One copy to be retained by the 54th GS Gp.

(5) The depot will process the requisitions using the following procedures:

(a) Receive the requisition at Customer Assistance Office, assign a special code and forward to Data Processing Division (DPD) for Key-punching and entry into the cycle.

(b) Process the requisition through normal depot processing channels.

(c) Mark the MRO and the TCMD with a green arrow alerting transportation and storage personnel that the item is a special requisition. MCC's copy and 124th Trans Comd's copy of the TCMD will also be marked with a green arrow.

(6) MCC and 124th Trans Comd will process the TCMD's as a priority transportation document according to the priority. TCMD's marked with a green arrow will not be considered for shipment to end stations by circumventing the priority system. If a TCMD has an 05 priority, it will receive an 02 shipping priority and will be given shipping consideration ahead of all like priorities awaiting shipment to an end station. The 02 shipping priority will not be shipped before an 02 request which has an 01 shipping priority unless such direction is received from ACofS, SP&O, USASUPCOM-CRB when the item is needed for emergency resupply.

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(7) The LSA will retain one copy of the DA Form 1348-1 (shipping document) and will mail that copy, which will be signed by the receiving LSA representative to show receipt of the item, to the 54th GS Gp, ATTN: AVCA CRB-GS-SS Class II and IV Officer. This copy will then be carried to the Class II and IV DSU to show completion of shipment and receipt of supplies.

b. Those units that are not supported by an LSA but require emergency resupply of Class II and IV items (less command controlled items) will use the following procedure to obtain supplies.

(1) The unit requiring the item will submit DA Form 2765-1 to the nearest LSA Commander.

(2) The LSA Commander will forward the information on the DA Form 2765-1 to the 54th GS Gp, ATTN: Logistics Operations Control Center (LOCC) by the most expeditious means possible, telephone, SSB, RTT. This transmission will include the following information:

(a) Organizational Document Number.

(b) Federal Stock Number (FSN).

(c) Unit of Issue.

(d) Quantity.

(e) Demand.

(f) Unit Identification Code.

(g) Priority.

(h) Item description.

(i) Publication Data.

(3) Once the information is transmitted to the 54th GS Gp, the LSA Commander will mail two copies of the DA Form 2765-1 to the 54th GS Gp, ATTN: AVCA CRB-GS-SS, Class II and IV Officer. If a courier is available then the DA Form 2765-1 may be hand carried to the 54th GS Gp's Logistics Section.

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(4) The 54th GS Gp representative will copy the information provided in paragraph b(2) of this circular on a DD Form 1348 and hand carry this to the USAD-CRB, an information copy to the Class II and IV DSU and one copy retained at 54th GS Gp for file. The document number assigned to this request will consist of the 8900 to 8999 series. USAD-CRB will receive the DD Form 1348 request from the 54th GS Gp representative and will hand carry the requisition through depot channels. Depot will then get the item booked through MCC and hand carry the TCMD to MCC.

(5) MCC and the 124th Trans Comd will treat the TCMD according to the priority indicated unless special instructions are issued from ACofS, SP&O, USASUPCOM-CRB.

(6) The LSA Commander will receive one copy of the signed DA Form 1348-1 from the receiving unit at his location and forward that copy to the 54th GS Gp, ATTN: AVCA CRB-GS-SS Class II and IV Officer.

c. Combat losses will be processed in accordance with procedures outlined in USARV Reg 735-3. To assist in expediting the replacement of combat losses the unit may contact the 54th GS Gp through the LSA Commander to obtain the 14 digit MILSTRIP Document number required by USARV Reg 735-3.

6. References:

- a. AR 711-16
- b. AR 735-35
- c. AR 725-50
- d. USARV Reg 735-3
- e. USARV Reg 735-2
- f. LC Reg 735-2

(AVCA CRB-GL)

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

JOSEPH F. SCHUMAN
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

/S/ G. W. Bauman
/T/ G. W. BAUMAN
MAJ, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

40 54th General Support Group
10 US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay
10 124th Transportation Command
5 Movements Control Center
5 ACofS, SP&O
5 ACofS, Transportation
10 ACofS, Supply
15 IFFV

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA GO-0

1 July 1970

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Logistical Support to Operation Binh
Tay III, Phases 1 and 2 (U)

Commanding General
US Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-O
APO 96384

1. (C) Purpose: The overall purpose of this after action report is to summarize logistical support provided to IFFV during both phases of subject operation.

2. (C) Discussion:

a. The timeframe of this after action report is from 11 May 1970 to 27 June 1970. This period covers the initial notification by First Field Force (IFFV), the build up of supply levels at the Ban Me Thuot Logistical Support Activity (LSA), the establishment of a rearm/refuel point at Duc Lap, phases 1 and 2 of the operation, and the final extraction on 27 June 1970.

b. The principal forces supported are listed in Annex A.

c. The principal activities during the support period are as follows:

(1) Initial warning of the impending operation was received by message from IFFV on 11 May 70. The 18th Engineer Brigade was tasked to construct berms for six 10,000 gal fuel tanks (bladders), 20 "blivets", and a rearm point by close of business 17 May 70. The Support Command was tasked to deliver 400 barrels of peneprime to Duc Lap during the period 13 - 16 May; establish and operate a refuel point in the vicinity of Duc Lap not later than 18 May; throughput air munitions to a rearm point at Duc Lap to be operated by the 17th Combat Aviation Group; and to provide one rough terrain forklift with operator to off load the air munitions.

(2) On 13 May 70 a Combat Essential (CE) request was made through the 1st Logistical Command to secure POL pumping and storage equipment for the Duc Lap refuel point. This equipment consisted of the following items:

INCLOSURE 11 to Incl 1

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- (a) 1 each 350 GPM pump (from US Army Depot - Saigon)
 - (b) 1 each 350 GPM filter/separator (from US Army Depot - Saigon)
 - (c) 2 each 50 GPM pump (from US Army Depot - Qui Nhon)
 - (d) 2 each 50 GPM filter/separator (From US Army Depot - Qui Nhon)
 - (e) 4 each 10,000 gal fuel bladders (from US Army Depot - Saigon)
 - (f) 4 each 10,000 gal fuel bladders (from US Army Depot - Qui Nhon)
- (3) Coordination was also effected with the 10th Aviation Battalion, Dong Ba Thin to secure additional hoses and jewelry to set up the 8 slick, 2 hook refueling point at Duc Lap.
- (4) On 13 May 70 a special convoy was run to Ban Me Thuot and Duc Lap to transport additional fuel, ammunition, and fire base construction materiel.
- (5) On 14 May 1970 an officer from this headquarters was sent to IFFV to act as Liaison Officer.
- (6) Shuttle convoys to Duc Lap from Ban Me Thuot began on 16 May 70, with the 54th General Support Group being responsible for the convoys, using their own tankers and "borrowed" tractor/trailers from the 124th Transportation Command.
- (7) The 3rd Battalion 506 Infantry (Air Mobile), augmented with a cavalry troop from the 2nd Squadron 1 Cavalry (A/2/1 Cav), arrived in Ban Me Thuot from Pleiku via C130 aircraft. They assumed the mission of road security from Ban Me Thuot east to the Khanh Hoa Province border.
- (8) A Combat Essential request was processed on 19 May 70 to ship five pallets of 20mm ammunition from Dong Ba Thin to Ban Me Thuot to support a new type of Cobra gunship. (Note: the gunships never arrived and the ammunition was subsequently extracted from Ban Me Thuot and returned to Cam Ranh Bay.)
- (9) Phase I of Binh Tay III began on 20 May 1970. See Annex B for recap. The 2/1 Cavalry replaced the 3/506 on 8 Jun 70.
- (10) Phase 1 concluded on 12 Jun 70.
- (11) On 19 Jun 70 22,000 gal of JP4 were hooked from Ban Me Thuot to Bandon (24 KM northwest of Ban Me Thuot) to a refuel point operated

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SUBJECT: After Action Report - Logistical Support to Operation Binh Tay III, Phases 1 and 2 (U)

by the 10th Aviation Battalion, consisting of 6 slick and 4 hook refuel points. Supply was provided from a 50,000 gal bag provided by the Air Force, with backup from two 10,000 gal bags. All refueling was accomplished from 500 gal blivets hooked from Ban Me Thuot.

(12) Phase 2 of the operation began on 20 Jun 70. See Annex B for recap.

(13) On 22 Jun 70 7,000 gal of JP4 were lost at Bandon when the unsecured 50,000 gal bag rolled down the hill, breaking off several fittings.

(14) Phase 2 concluded on 27 Jun 70. See Annex B for recap.

d. Observations and Lessons Learned:

(1) Due to difficulties in coordination and absence of definitive information, it is advisable to have a Liaison Officer attached to IFFV Headquarters during large scale tactical operations supported by this command.

(2) Tactical operations involving ARVN units are not always announced well in advance. As a result, logistical planning data is not always complete and exact. Supporting units must be sufficiently flexible to meet all changing requirements.

(3) Close coordination must be effected with all supported units as soon as possible, in order to determine supply requirements, particularly for classes I, III, IV, and V.

(4) Considerable difficulty was encountered in getting together required equipment to set up the refuel point at Duc Lap. This command is not in the retail POL business, and does not have TOE units with equipment for set up of refuel points. For future operations, supported aviation units should be tasked by IFFV to set up and operate their own refuel points.

(5) Per MACV Directive, shipping activities, including LSA's are required to provide their own rigging equipment when rigging supplies for hooking. This also applies to rigging of blivets. During Phase 2 when blivets were hooked from the Ban Me Thuot LSA to Bandon and returned empty, the LSA did not have rigging equipment or personnel qualified as riggers. Consideration should be given to stocking rigging equipment at LSA's, and making available riggers from the 109th Quartermaster Company (AD) to assist LSA personnel.

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(6) Air mobile infantry battalions do not normally deploy with sufficient vehicles to transport supplies. The Support Command must be prepared to provide five ton cargo trucks to such units while they are engaged in tactical operations within II Corps South. Six five ton cargo trucks were provided the 3/506 Inf while in the Ban Me Thuot area. These trucks came from the US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay, together with drivers. The drivers were attached to the Battalion S4.

(7) During the entire operation, difficulty was experienced in obtaining timely, and in some cases accurate, consumption statistics for all classes of supply, particularly classes III and V. Procedures should be developed to insure that this information is transmitted in a timely and accurate manner.

(8) A summary of statistics collected during the operation is attached as Annex C.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Annexes:

A - Supported Forces
B - Tactical Recap
C - Statistics

A. GONZALEZ

CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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CONFIDENTIAL**ANNEX A - SUPPORTED FORCES (Operation Binh Tay III)****1. Phase 1**

a. 23rd ARVN Division Tactical Command Post

b. Task Force 45 (20 May - 11 Jun)

(1) 45th ARVN Regiment Tactical Command Post

(2) 1st Battalion 45th Regiment

(3) 3rd Battalion 45th Regiment

(4) 4th Battalion 45th Regiment

(5) 1st Company 2nd Battalion 45th Regiment (25 May - 11 Jun)

(6) 45th Recon Company

c. Task Force 44 (4 Jun - 12 Jun)

(1) 44th ARVN Regiment Tactical Command Post

(2) 1st Battalion 44th Regiment

(3) 3rd Battalion 44th Regiment

(4) 3rd Battalion 53rd Regiment

(5) 53rd Recon Company

d. Task Force 8 (20 May - 2 Jun)

(1) 8th ARVN Armored Cavalry Tactical Command Post

(2) 1st Troop 8th Armored Cavalry Squadron

(3) 3rd Troop 8th Armored Cavalry Squadron

(4) 3rd Battalion 44th Regiment

(5) 413th Security Company

e. 23rd ARVN Division Troops (20 May - 12 Jun)

(1) 411th Security Company

(2) 412th Security Company

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ANNEX A - Continued:

- (3) 23rd Recon Company
- (4) Direct Support: D Troop 2nd Squadron 1st Armored Cavalry (Air Cav)
 - f. 2nd Squadron 1st Armored Cavalry (US)
 - g. 3rd Battalion 506th Infantry (Air Mobile) (US)
 - (1) 687th Land Clearing Company (Rome Plow)(US)
 - (2) D Battery 320th Artillery (105mm)
 - h. C Company 75th Ranger Battalion (US)
 - i. A Battery 6th Battalion 32nd Artillery (8" How/175mm SP)(US)
 - j. C Battery 2nd Battalion 17th Artillery (105mm How)(US)
 - k. B Battery 2nd Battalion 17th Artillery (105mm How)(US)
 - l. A Troop 7th Squadron 17th Combat Aviation Group
- 2. Phase 2
 - a. 23rd ARVN Division Tactical Command Post
 - b. Task Force 8 (20 Jun - 24 Jun)
 - (1) 8th ARVN Armored Cavalry Tactical Command Post
 - (2) 1st Troop 8th Armored Cavalry Regiment
 - (3) 3rd Troop 8th Armored Cavalry Regiment
 - (4) 3rd Battalion 53rd Regiment (-)
 - (5) 409th Security Company
 - (6) 413th Security Company
 - c. Task Force 44 (20 Jun - 27 Jun)
 - (1) 44th ARVN Regiment Tactical Command Post
 - (2) 1st Battalion 44th Regiment
 - (3) 3rd Battalion 44th Regiment
 - (4) 44th Recon Company

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ANNEX A - Continued:

- d. Task Force 45 (20 Jun - 27 Jun)
 - (1) 45th ARVN Regiment Tactical Command Post
 - (2) 1st Battalion 45th Regiment
 - (3) 3rd Battalion 45th Regiment
 - (4) 45th Recon Company
 - (5) Direct Support: D Troop 2nd Squadron 1st Armored Cavalry (Air Cav)
- e. 23rd ARVN Division Troops (20 Jun - 27 Jun)
 - (1) 411th Security Company
 - (2) 412th Security Company
 - (3) 23rd Recon Company
- f. 2nd Squadron 1st Armored Cavalry (US)
- g. 155th Aviation Company (-)(US)

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ANNEX B - TACTICAL RECAP (Operation Binh Tay III)

1. (C) Highlights of activity, phase 1:

a. Phase 1 was preceded by 30 preparatory B52 strikes and began at 200100Z May 70 when lead elements of the 8th ARVN Armored Cavalry moved overland into the southern half of Base Area 740 and Task Force 45 conducted a combat assault into the northern portion of the base area. Neither force met initial enemy resistance. The objectives of the operation were to destroy enemy base camps, logistic installations, and enemy forces within the target area.

b. Ground contact was much lighter than that anticipated. Allied aviation was successful in attacking supply routes and lines of communication as evidenced by the fact that 15 enemy vehicles were destroyed during the first week of the operation. The southern half of the base area proved relatively unproductive. On 25 May, Task Force 8 was committed to the northwestern part of the AO to interdict lines of communication and enemy infiltration routes.

c. With the exception of two contacts between elements of the 45th Regiment and estimated enemy companies on 22 and 28 May, combat activity was limited to small unit engagements of short duration. ARVN elements continued to saturate the area and were only moderately productive in uncovering caches until 26 May when the 4th Battalion 45th Regiment uncovered the most significant cache of the Binh Tay series of operations. It contained over 20 tons of ammunition, 20 tons of rice, 500 small arms, 100 crew served weapons, miscellaneous communications equipment, and two vehicles.

d. On 2 June, Task Force 8 returned to Vietnam and was replaced by Task Force 44 which continued operations with Task Force 45 until termination of the first phase on 12 June. On 10 June, D/2-1 supporting the operation was engaged in an air to ground action which resulted in 36 enemy KIA. Upon termination of Phase 1, both task forces returned to Ban Me Thuot where plans were developed for the next phase.

2. (C) Highlights of activity, phase 2:

a. Phase 2 began on 200345Z Jun 70 following the employment of eight B52 strikes on the 19th. Task Force 44 and 45 conducted air mobile assaults into three LZ's to the north of Base Area 740 in an area reported as an enemy resupply point/ Task Force 8 moved overland and reentered Base Area 740.

b. There were no significant contacts or additional caches discovered during the second phase of the operation.

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ANNEX B - Continued:

c. Task Force 8 withdrew on 24 June, and Task Forces 44 and 45 were extracted on 27 June.

d. Operation Binh Tay III officially terminated upon closure of Task Force 44 into Ban Me Thuot at 270830Z Jun 70.

3. (C) Overall results for the 32 day operation (excluding a seven day standdown) resulted in the discovery and destruction/evacuation of 15 food caches, 10 weapons/munitions caches, and five medical caches. Confirmed operational results include 141 enemy killed, and the capture or destruction of 587 small arms, 133 crew served weapons, 239 structures, 77 bunkers, 412 tons of rice, 5500 pounds of salt, 22 vehicles, and over 20 tons of ammunition. ARVN forces sustained 26 killed, 67 wounded, and two missing. Seven US air crewmen were wounded in direct support of the operation.

4. (C) Operational results (figures in parenthesis reflect phase 2):

a. Enemy KIA	141 (4)
b. Enemy PW	1
c. Ind Wpns	587 (1)
d. Crew served wpn	133
e. Detainees	2
f. Returnees	1
g. Structures	239
h. Bunkers	77
i. Rice	412 tons (.8)
j. Livestock	140
k. SA ammo	2400 rds
l. Salt	5550 lbs (550)
m. Mort rds	10 60 MM
n. Hand grenades	13
o. Mines	1
p. Radios	8
q. Switchboards	2
r. Vehicles	22
s. Misc ammo	20 tons
t. Generators	1
u. FRD KIA	26 (2)
v. FRD WIA	67 (2)
w. FRD MIA	2

5. (C) US Support to RVNAF:

a. 8 inch artillery	372 rounds	144 missions
b. 175mm artillery	397 rounds	283 missions
c. TAC air	295	
d. AF/GS air	0	

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ANNEX B - Continued:

e. Gunships	188
f. Lift ships	208
g. MEDEVAC missions	28
h. Resupply missions	132

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ANNEX C - STATISTICS (Operation Binh Tay III)

1. Troops involved:

a. Cambodia

(1) ARVN: 3190

(2) US: 71

b. Vietnam

(1) ARVN: 868

(2) US: 1200

- | | |
|--|---------|
| 2. Total number line haul convoys: | 11 |
| 3. Total S&P trailers: | 364 |
| 4. Total 5000 gal tankers: | 290 |
| 5. Total dry cargo transported (Short tons): | 4108 |
| 6. Total bulk fuel transported (gallons): | |
| a. JP4 | 785000 |
| b. MOGAS | 135000 |
| c. Diesel | 370000 |
| d. AVGAS | 85000 |
| e. Total | 1375000 |
| 7. Total ammunition consumed (aviation)(short ton) | 336 |

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USASUPCOM-Cam Ranh Bay

Construction Projects

(31 Oct 69 to 31 Jul 70)

1. Port Area Construction: During this period major improvements were made in the port area. The bulkhead was repaired between Piers 2 and 3, between Piers 3 and 4 and south of Pier 1. Eleven thousand square yards of asphaltic hardstand were constructed between Piers 3 and 4 and Piers 2 and 3. Work has started on the construction of 17,500 square yards of crushed rock hardstand for the retrograde area south of Pier 1. The wash facility for this area is in the final design stage, the relieving platform was constructed south of Pier 1 and work has started on another relieving platform north of Pier 1. Construction of the RO-RO pier has started and should be completed by the end of August. The 831 Barge Pier on South Beach was completed; it was built to improve coastal traffic. These improvements will insure the continued use of the port facilities and will increase the efficiency of sea operations.

2. Roadwork: Repairs were made on Bayshore Drive, the main access road to Cam Ranh Bay South Post. These consisted of placing 9,000 square yards of asphaltic concrete over badly deteriorated surface. A road connecting Ammo Area "C" with Ammo Area "Y" was completed. Work began on resurfacing the main roads in the cantonment area. RMK is now tasked to upgrade the entire road net of Cam Ranh Bay.

3. Security Lighting: Projects for installation of security lighting progressed during this period. The security lighting at Tank Farms 1 and 2 is nearing completion. A project for security lighting for Ammo Area "A" and "C" has been approved. A job order request for lighting of Tank Farm 3 and the POL package yard has been submitted. In addition, an increased security lighting system has been proposed for the protection of the My Ca Bridge.

4. MILVAN: A hardstand for staging MILVAN containers was constructed near the port and a MILVAN washrack was also put into operation.

5. Upgrade Program: As much of the construction in Cam Ranh Bay has exceeded its life expectancy, programs have been initiated to preserve the present facilities. These include programs to paint existing structures and upgrade the electrical wiring. Beside prolonging the life of the buildings on Cam Ranh, the electrical upgrade program will eliminate numerous safety hazards. A program to upgrade all messhalls has been in operation since the first of the year.

6. Pier Protection: Operational support from the 18th Engineer Brigade has been approved to provide protective screens at each of the My Ca Bridge Piers. The system will significantly decrease the accessibility to the piers to potential sappers.

INCLOSURE 12 to Incl 1

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7. PDO Yard: During this period a new PDO yard was constructed and put into operation. This facility is situated so as to provide a more direct route of scrap and saleable items from units making turn-ins to the PDO and from the PDO to the port.

8. Power Distribution: A program to replace the 4 electrical power ships with a land based generation system has seen the shut down of 2 of the ships to date. At the completion of the conversion, the system will have a capacity of 19,000 kw with a predicted peak load of 14,000 kw.

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SUBJECT: Operation OTTER

The following is Operation OTTER performance data for the periods indicated:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SHIPPED FORWARD</u>	<u>RETROGRADED</u>
FEB	19,904	5080
MAR	32,702	5440
APR	12,100	6010
MAY	9,000	8000
JUN	10,000	6000
JUL	<u>10,500</u>	<u>7500</u>
	89,206	38,030

NOTE: All Figures are in Pounds

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